What should be the proper treatment selection for patients with type 2 diabetes?
The incidence of diabetes has been growing and the complications arising from uncontrolled blood glucose has been increasing along with it. It is estimated that more than 80% of deaths in developing countries are associated with life-threatening complications associated with diabetes.
Various treatment approaches have been implemented to avoid these complications and deaths related to diabetes. The mainstay of therapy for diabetes has been diet and exercise in conjunction with glucose-lowering drugs. Each of these agents are implicated with a potential benefit in health outcomes and mortality.
Agents from metformin have proven to be the first-line treatment due to its long-term benefits and improved glycemic control, to thiazolidinediones, which were falling out of favor due to their effects on heart failure and now proves to be beneficial in stroke.
Ongoing research efforts have compared various treatment modalities in head-to-head trials in order to understand glycemic events in diabetes. In a recent meta-analysis conducted by Giovanni F.M. Strippoli, PhD at the University of Bari, it is explained that sometimes these trials fail to dive into the cardiovascular mortality of these medications due to its inability to compare all treatment modalities simultaneously.
Strippoli and colleagues wanted to estimate the relative efficacy and safety of glucose-lowering medications. They extracted data from 301 clinical trials, which took into account 1,417,367 patient-months. All of these trials were 24 weeks of duration or longer. They included biguanides, sulfonylureas, thiazolidinediones, DPP-4 inhibitors, SGLT-2 inhibitors, GLP-1 agonists, basal insulin, meglitinides, and alpha-glucosidase inhibitors.
All of those studies that looked at medication regimens no longer supported by treatment guidelines or that have been withdrawn from the market were excluded from the study.
The primary endpoint of the study was the association of drug treatments with cardiovascular mortality.
Secondary endpoints were stratified into two endpoints, individual safety and individual efficacy. Secondary efficacy endpoints included all-cause mortality, myocardial infarction, stroke, A1c levels, and treatment failure.
Secondary safety endpoints included serious adverse events, hypoglycemia, and body weight.(My comment: the pros and cons that patients and doctors are most interested in)
After randomization, trials were separated into those where patients were given a monotherapy regimen, other drugs were added to metformin, or where other drugs added to metformin and sulfonylureas.
In those trials where drugs were used as monotherapy, there was no significant difference in the drugs used as monotherapy and the odds of death from cardiovascular complications. Nonetheless, these were associated with lower A1c levels. However, there was insufficient data to determine treatment rankings for these effects.
There was a greater risk of hypoglycemia with basal insulin (OR, 17.9 [95% CI, 1.97 to 162]; RD, 10% [95% CI, 0.08% to 20%]) or sulfonylureas (OR, 3.13 [95% CI, 2.39 to 4.12]; RD, 10% [95% CI, 7% to 13%]) as monotherapy. Furthermore, when analyzing those drugs added to metformin there was no significant association between any drug classes and the risk of death, despite 45 cardiovascular deaths reported in 26 trials. Similar findings were seen in all-cause mortality and myocardial infarction when adding other drugs to metformin therapy. However, there was lower risk of stroke in those regimens that included metformin and DPP-4 inhibitors when compared to metformin and sulfonylureas (OR, 0.47 [95% CI, 0.23 to 0.95]; RD, −0.2% [95% CI, −0.4% to −0.04%).
Treatment failure was noted less often in those patients receiving metformin and SGLT-2 inhibitors. In terms of weight and hypoglycemia, the use of metformin and sulfonylureas ranked worse when compared to all different treatment modalities. Furthermore, in the third set of trials that looked at drugs added to metformin and sulfonylureas, there was no association between any of drugs and the risk of cardiovascular death. This same trend was seen with all-cause mortality and serious adverse events; no significant association was observed.
Alpha-glucosidase inhibitors provided the least A1c reduction when added to metformin and sulfonylureas, when compared to the implementation of basal insulin or thiazolidinediones (SMD, 1.42 [95% CI, 0.57 to 2.26]). Treatment failure was more notable in patients receiving DPP-4 inhibitors when compared to those patients where basal insulin was added. Hypoglycemia was observed less in those patients receiving GLP-1 agonists than those receiving thiazolidinediones. All drug classes provided weight reductions except thiazolidinediones and basal insulin.
In conclusion, these findings highlight that the use of glucose lowering agents alone or in combination are not implicated with cardiovascular mortality, all-cause mortality, or serious adverse events. Significant reductions in A1c can be obtained with the use of individual glucose lowering) agents. When these agents are added to metformin, clinically significant reductions can be obtained.
Practice Pearls:
- Sulfonylureas or basal insulin should be avoided in the setting where hypoglycemia is of great concern.
- Weight reductions can be obtained with regimens utilizing SGLT-2 inhibitors and GLP-1 agonists.
- There is no significant association between the use of various glucose-lowering medications (alone or in combination) and the risk of cardiovascular mortality.
References:
Palmer SC, Mavridis D, Nicolucci A, et al. Comparison of Clinical Outcomes and Adverse Events Associated With Glucose-Lowering Drugs in Patients With Type 2 Diabetes: A Meta-analysis. JAMA. 2016;316(3):313-324. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.9400.
American Diabetes Association. Standards of medical care in diabetes: Summary of revisions-2016, 7: approaches to glycemic treatment. Diabetes Care. 2016;38(suppl):S4-S5
I’m delighted that The BMJ has stood by this article and decided against retraction. Two outside reviewers judged that the criticisms of the piece did not merit its retraction, and in the end, the corrections made by The BMJ do not, in my view, materially undermine any of the article’s key claims. This article therefore stands as one of the most serious ever, peer-reviewed critiques of the expert report for the US Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGAs).
The importance of the DGAs, and therefore of this article, should not be understated (and indeed was recognized by many in the mainstream media when the article was published). The DGAs have long been considered the “gold standard,” informing the US food supply, military rations, US government feeding assistance programs such as the National School Lunch Program which are, altogether, consumed by 1 in 4 Americans each month, as well as the guidelines of professional societies and governments around the world, and eating habits generally.
Yet rates of obesity began to shoot upwards in the very year, 1980, that the DGAs were introduced, and the diabetes epidemic began soon thereafter. A critically important yet little understood issue is why the DGAs have failed, so spectacularly, to safeguard health from the very nutrition-related diseases that they were supposed to prevent.
In documenting fundamental failures in the science behind the DGAs, this article offers new insights; It establishes that a vast amount of nutrition science funded by the National Institutes of Health and other governments worldwide has, for decades, been systematically ignored or dismissed, and that therefore, that the DGAs are not based on a comprehensive reviews of the most rigorous science. Incorporating this long-ignored relevant science would likely lead to fundamentally different DGAs and could very well be an important step in infusing them with the power to better fight the nutrition-related diseases.
A fundamental question is why 170+ researchers (including all the 2015 DGA committee members, or “DGAC”), organized by the advocacy group, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), would sign a letter asking for retraction. After all, in the weeks following publication, any person had the opportunity to submit a “Rapid Response” to the article, and both CSPI and the DGAC did so, alleging many errors. I responded to them all in my Rapid Response. This is the normal post-publication process.
Yet after all this, CSPI returned for a second round of criticisms, recycling two of the issues (CSPI points #3 and #10) that I had already addressed in my Rapid Response (and which had required no correction), adding another 9 (one of which, #4, contained no challenge of fact), and demanding that based on these alleged errors, the article be retracted. CSPI then circulated this letter widely to colleagues and asked them to sign on.
This lack of substance in the retraction effort seems to point to the reality that it was first and foremost an act of advocacy—a heavy handed attempt to silence arguments with which CSPI, a longtime supporter of the Dietary Guidelines and its allies disagree.[ footnote 1] And this applies not just to the retraction letter but to other CSPI efforts to stifle alternative viewpoints. Earlier this year, for example, I was dis-invited from the National Food Policy Conference after CSPI, together with the USDA official in charge of the Dietary Guidelines, threatened to withdraw if I were included, details of which are reported here and which a Spiked columnist called an act of “censorship.”
It’s important to note that I am not the only person disturbed by the lack of rigorous science underpinning our dietary guidelines. Numerous scientists around the world have expressed concern about the science. And indeed, this consternation is shared by no less than the US Congress, which held a hearing on Oct 7, 2015 to address its serious doubts about the DGAs. Such was this concern that last year that Congress mandated the first-ever major peer-review of the DGAs, by the National Academy of Medicine. Congress appropriated $1 million for this review, and it additionally stipulated that all members of the 2015 DGA committee recuse themselves from the process.
What is the dangerous information challenging the DGAs that cannot be heard on a conference panel nor published in a peer-reviewed journal?
The major findings of this article are that:
1. The DGAC’s finding that the evidence of a “strong” link between saturated fats and heart disease was not clearly supported by the evidence cited. (Note that as of last year, the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada no longer limits saturated fats. Note, also, that Frank Hu, the Harvard epidemiologist in charge of the DGAC review on saturated fats, was an energetic promoter of the retraction letter against my article that critiqued his review, according to emails obtained through FOIA requests);
2. Successive DGA committees have for decades ignored or dismissed a large body of rigorous (randomized controlled trial) literature on the low-fat diet, on more than 50K subjects, collectively finding that this diet is ineffective for fighting obesity, diabetes, heart disease or any kind of cancer;
3. Although the DGAs have for decades recommended avoiding saturated fats and cholesterol to prevent heart disease, no DGA committee has ever directly reviewed the enormous body of rigorous (government-funded, randomized controlled trials) evidence, testing more than 25,000 people, on this hypothesis. Many reviews of this data have concluded that saturated fats have no effect on cardiovascular mortality;
4. The DGAC ignored a large body of scientific literature on low-carbohydrate diets (including several “long term” trials, of 2-years duration) demonstrating that these diets are safe and highly effective for combatting obesity, diabetes, and heart disease;
5. The Nutrition Evidence Library (NEL) set up by USDA to do systematic reviews of the science did not meet its own standards for its review of saturated fats in 2010;
6. Although the DGAC is supposed to consult the NEL to conduct systematic reviews of the science, the 2015 DGAC did so for only 67% of the questions that required systematic reviews;
7. For a number of key reviews, the 2015 DGAC relied on work done in part by the American Heart Association and the American College of Cardiology, which are private associations supported by industry and therefore have a potential conflict of interest;
8. The DGAs, for the first time, introduce the “vegetarian diet” as one of its three, recommended “Dietary Patterns,” yet a NEL review of this diet concluded that the evidence for this its disease-fighting powers is only “limited,” which is the lowest rank of evidence assigned for available data;
9. The DGA’s three recommended “Dietary Patterns” are supported by only limited evidence. The NEL review found only “limited” or “insufficient” evidence that the diets could combat diabetes and only “moderate” evidence that the diets can help people lose weight. The report also gave a strong rating to the evidence that its recommended diets can fight heart disease, yet here, several studies are presented, but none unambiguously supports this claim. In conclusion, the quantity of recommended diets are supported by a small quantity of rigorous evidence that only marginally supports claims that these diets can promote better health than alternatives;
10. The DGA process does not require committee members to disclose conflicts of interest and also that, for the first time, the committee chair came not from a university but from industry;
11. The 2015 DGAC conducted a number of reviews in ways that were not systematic. This allowed for the potential introduction of bias (e.g., cherry picking of the evidence).
This last claim, on the systematic nature of the DGAC reviews, is the subject of the corrections published in The BMJ this week, and refer to CSPI points #1, #2, #7, and #8 (two of which are statements in the text and two of which are in the supporting tables). I am grateful to have had the opportunity to work with The BMJ on developing this notice.
The BMJ has placed a word limit on my response. For the rest of this comment, please see: http://thebigfatsurprise.com/comment-bmj-correction-notice/
Footnote 1
CSPI has fought for decades to eliminate saturated fats from the American food supply (so much so, that throughout the late 1980s, CSPI advocated for replacing saturated fats with trans fats and succeeded in driving up consumption of trans fats to historic levels, as described in The Big Fat Surprise, pp.227-228). CSPI has also long advocated for shifting away from animal foods containing saturated fats, towards a plant-based diet based on grains and industrial vegetable oils. The researchers who joined CSPI in signing the letter are largely adherents to this view; many have participated in generating the science that has been used to support the hypothesis that fat and cholesterol cause heart disease, and it is upon this hypothesis that the Guidelines have been based.
Competing interests: I have read and understood BMJ policy on declaration of interests and declare that I am the author of The Big Fat Surprise (Simon & Schuster, 2014), on the history, science, and politics of dietary fat recommendations. I have received modest honorariums for presenting my research findings presented in the book to a variety of groups related to the medical, restaurant, financial, meat, and dairy industries. I am also a board member of a non-profit organization, the Nutrition Coalition, dedicated to ensuring that nutrition policy is based on rigorous science.